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FREEDOM FROM WANT: FAMINE RELIEF IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
The United States, during both the Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan
administrations, pursued humanitarian relief in the Horn of Africa and East Africa with
an eye towards Cold War politics. During the Carter administration the focus was on
Ethiopia and the regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam, while during the Reagan
administration the United States’ efforts were mainly targeted towards Sudan and the
regime of Gaffar Nimeiry. In both instances, the United States was concerned with the
politics of the Cold War, trying to create a more positive image of the U.S. abroad by
relieving world hunger, while also propping up governments that supported U.S. interests
during the Cold War against the Soviet Union.
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CHAPTER ONE: MAN’S MOST FUNDAMENTAL NEED
“We meet to address man’s most fundamental need,” Henry Kissinger asserted,
as he addressed an audience of fellow statesmen at the World Food Conference.1
Convened on November 5, 1974, the Conference that met in Rome was created to address
the rising uncertainty about the sustainability of global food supplies. Earlier that year, a
devastating famine had struck the country of Bangladesh, resulting in the deaths of over
30,000 people. Kissinger’s speech at the Conference was a call to action for the first
world, a recognition of the fact that to avert future disasters like Bangladesh world
powers must begin to take the necessary precautions to shore up food supplies.
Kissinger’s speech harkened back to over thirty years of similar language that evolved
out of the height of the Second World War. President Franklin Roosevelt’s infamous
Four Freedoms, established in his Annual Message to Congress on January 6, 1941,
outlined the basic rights that all people had: freedom of speech, freedom of worship,
freedom from want, and freedom from fear. The freedoms worked their way into the
formation of the United Nations, and most importantly the UN Declaration of Human
Rights that was orchestrated by Eleanor Roosevelt, the four being woven into the fabric
of that document. The freedom from want continued to be elaborated in the following
decades, as successive international meetings delineated what exactly the freedom from
want entailed. The right to food, always associated with the freedom from want, quickly
took on importance. In 1966, at the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
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Henry Kissinger, Address to World Food Congress on November 5, 1974.
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Cultural Rights (ICESC), which recognized “the right of everyone to an adequate
standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and
housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions” explicitly singling out
food as a singular need common to all humanity. The World Food Conference in 1974
adopted the Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition, which
asserted that “every man, woman, and child has the inalienable right to be free from
hunger and malnutrition.”
Yet, the United States was reluctant to wholly commit itself to these grand
proclamations. The U.S. would not sign the ICESC treaty until 1979, and has to this day
yet to ratify it. Despite the forceful language of the Universal Declaration created at the
World Food Conference, there was little meat on the bones, as it were, of the agreement.
Words could not feed hungry mouths. The freedom from want, and the freedom from
hunger specifically, no matter its guise, has always been inextricably wrapped up in
concerns that are less than altruistic. Humanitarian relief efforts designed to combat
hunger since the Roosevelt’s speech before Congress in 1941 have been heavily
influenced by grand geopolitical designs. The Marshall Plan under Truman, Eisenhower’s
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress,
these programs were not only meant to relieve the suffering of various peoples, but to
influence the course of the Cold War in the favor of the United States by improving
relations with allies and shoring up the socioeconomic fabric of unstable regions.
Three years after Kissinger’s speech, in 1977, a new president took office. Jimmy
Carter’s dramatic reorientation of U.S. foreign relations around the language of human
rights provided fertile ground for further complicating what exactly the definitions of
2

human rights meant. Hunger, however, remained at the forefront of Carter’s human rights
push. In the opening months of his presidency, Carter’s administration focused not only
on promoting the human rights agenda that would be the focus of much of his term in
office, but redefining the ways in which hunger relief was doled out, making sure that he
would avoid the mistakes of the past and not give aid to governments that were deemed
to be stringent human rights abusers. Following in Carter’s wake, Ronald Reagan took
office in 1981. Although Reagan’s administration cast itself as the answer to what it
considered to be the failed policies of Jimmy Carter, especially in regard to the emphasis
of human rights and the downgrading of the importance of the geopolitics of the Cold
War, Reagan found himself entangled in the same human rights issues that Carter did,
especially in regards to hunger. A common point between these two disparate presidential
administrations were their attempts to combat hunger abroad, most particularly in the
Horn of Africa. The Horn, a region continuously wracked by drought and famine, was of
particular interest to both administrations in the framework of the Cold War. Examining
how both administrations addressed famine in the Horn is an illustrative exercise, as it
reveals not only the strategic Cold War interests that were part of the impetus behind
hunger relief, but also shows the limits of the language of human rights in foreign
relations.

3

CHAPTER TWO: FEEDING THE BITTER WORLD
“We cannot effectively promote multilateral diplomacy, control the proliferation
of nuclear arms, defuse international terrorism…or protect our security interests in…a
hungry, angry, and bitter world...” Secretary of State Cyrus Vance’s testimony before a
Congressional Appropriations Committee in March of 1977 encompassed the outlook of
President Jimmy Carter’s administration towards world hunger.2 Increasingly “gloomy”
outlooks on the state of world food supplies were wrapped up in a future that seemed
destined to suffer from climate change and instability, which would be particularly
detrimental to less developed nations. Such projections created an atmosphere of intense
concern within the Carter administration and a desire to forestall world hunger. Less
powerful nations were increasingly banding together to bargain with or force the hand of
the United States in international diplomacy, and projections within Carter’s
administration indicated that this trend would not only continue but get exponentially
worse if desperate nation-states found themselves starving.
Real fears arose about the possibility that countries, in a climate of desperation,
would lash out in response to force assistance from more secure nations like the United
States who had, and would continue to have, strong food surpluses. The demands from
Lesser-Developed Countries (LDCs) were projected to increase if there was a period of
extended food scarcity, perhaps even reaching dangerous levels of “terrorism and
‘nuclear diplomacy’ in order to strong-arm the United States and its allies into handing

2
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over food, if the situation within their borders became untenable.3 In response to what
appeared to be dramatic threats to the future of world stability and in order to protect the
United States’ security, President Carter’s administration ordered the creation of new and
expanded food aid programs. These programs would facilitate the stockpiling of surplus
grain and other crops that would cushion the blow if global food production levels began
to drop for extended periods of time. From the onset of his presidency in 1977 these
initiatives were promoted and formed as an extension of Carter’s extremely human rights
focused foreign policy. Carter's emphasis on human rights reflected both a desire to
reorient the popular image of the United States abroad, rolling back the disapproval that
the U.S. had garnered during the Vietnam conflict, and a need to create a foreign policy
that was morally focused and eminently relatable to the American people.
The logistical drain of the drawn out war in Vietnam and the vitriol that was
directed towards the United States’ continued persecution of that conflict combined to
create an international and domestic climate of discontent when Carter came into office
in 1977. The United States was violating the same civil rights and standards of justice
that it claimed to hold most dear, and which were used by U.S. policy makers as a way to
delineate themselves from the Soviet Union. The perception of the United States abroad
was at its nadir because of the blatant hypocrisy of the United States’ actions in Vietnam,
, and this was problematic in the global Cold War, in which having international allies
was an absolute necessity in the minds of those same policy makers. Allies meant control
over different regions of the world, as the United States had upheld a long standing policy
of containing the spread of communism through the use of proxy governments and

3
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militaries around the world. Carter himself accurately summed up the post-Vietnam
feeling of most American policy makers in his 1975 speech in Tokyo, saying that “with
the end of the Vietnam conflict, a tremendous burden has been lifted from our
shoulders."4 There was now a major opportunity for the United States to correct
international opinion, shoring up alliances and good relations in order to maintain the
position of the U.S. in the Cold War.
The imperative of the United States was, above all else, to affirm global stability
in the battlefield of the global Cold War, where international instability was associated
with the possibility of future communist influence and, thus, a weakening of U.S. power.
Internally, the American public was incredibly war-weary and dissatisfied with the way
that the government had handled the conflict, and Carter needed to reassure the American
people that his administration would not rely on the same kind of morally questionable
actions that previous presidents had undertaken in order to prosecute the Cold War.
Image improvement at home was as important as it was abroad; both of these issues
relating back towards the overall need for Carter and other Cold War presidents to
maintain stability and control over the situation at home and abroad.
Indeed, order was almost an addiction, as chaos was one of the greatest enemies
to the parity of Cold War power structures. Unstable nations were unknowns in the
games of allegiances between the U.S. and the Soviets; recently freed post-colonial
nations, especially in Africa, were new players at the table of the Cold War and found
themselves rapidly forced to take sides in the conflict. Attempts by some countries to
retain neutrality were largely met with failure. The greatest example of this is the Non-

4

Address by Jimmy Carter. Tokyo, May 28, 1975. Foreign Relations of the United
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Aligned Movement (NAM), which began in 1961 as a loose coalition of states that
refused to take sides officially during the conflict.5 The neutrality of the states that
comprised the NAM eroded rapidly over time, as they found themselves pressed by the
realities of the Cold War into taking sides, at least tacitly. Whether by economic or
military aid, nations like India, Egypt, and Yugoslavia would undermine the neutral
principles of the NAM, though the organization itself would outlast the Cold War. As
true neutrality was not an actually feasible option, newly created nations, most of which
fell under the LDC category (or, rather, in the Third World), attempted to play the two
super powers off of one another, vacillating between supporting one or another, flipping
sides if need be, in order to attain a semblance of non-alignment, or banded together to
form new regional organizations like the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to try and
consolidate what power they had to oppose outside influence by the United States and the
Soviet Union.

The established foreign relations historiography on human rights has evolved over
time, mirroring the historical evolution of actual human right principles. Early scholars
such as Elizabeth Borgwardt in A New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human
Rights and Mary Ann Glendon in A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights both trace the origins of twentieth-century
conceptions of human rights.6 Authors such as Jason M. Colby, Vanessa Walker, and
William Michael Schmildi have been staunch defenders and apologists of Carters foreign
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policy, arguing that despite its apparent flaws there were tangible benefits to people
around the world.7 Newer works on Carter include Barbara Keys’ Reclaiming American
Virtue: The Human Rights Revolution of the 1970s and Piero Gleijeses’ Visions of
Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria and the Struggle for Southern Africa which
emphasizes the global connections among Carter’s foreign policies by utilizing
multiarchival research.8 Carter has received special attention by foreign relations
historians like these because of his revolutionary emphasis on human rights as the
governing principle of his foreign policy. Studies in global hunger within the context of
U.S. foreign policy, such as Nick Cullather’s The Hungry World, have examined
modernization efforts in South Asia, showing how U.S. efforts there in the 1960's had
long-standing negative repercussions for the region and failed to make substantive gains
in curbing hunger levels.9

7

Jason M. Colby, “A Chasm of Values and Outlook: The Carter Administration’s Human
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Examinations of Carter’s foreign policy have tended to gloss over hunger and the
use of food aid, focusing instead on the theoretical origins of Carter’s human rights
ideology, large-scale international events like the Iranian Hostage Crisis or the Camp
David Accords, and the success of using human rights as foreign policy in select cases.
Geographically, a great deal of scholarship has been given to examining application of
Carter’s foreign policy towards regions like South America, Southern Africa, and
Southeast Asia, looking at human rights crises in places such as Guatemala, South Africa,
and Cambodia. While there has been an acknowledgement amongst scholars about the
Carter administration’s desire to use human rights to positively affect domestic and
international opinion of the U.S., a serious examination of Carter’s methodology in this
regard has not been done. This paper will attempt to fill a gap both in hunger studies and
examinations of Carter’s foreign policy by focusing on a region largely neglected in the
foreign relations historiography of these subjects, Eastern Africa and the Horn region,
specifically looking at Ethiopia and Uganda.10 Although the Carter administration took
the long term negative effects of global hunger seriously, their hunger relief efforts were
not entirely altruistic or focused on upholding stability Taking advantage of newly
released documents from the Foreign Relations of the United States series, the paper will
also examine the Carter administration’s usage of hunger aid towards human rights
abusers as a means to not only stave off famine related instability and disaster, but to
increase U.S. popularity at home and abroad, shedding further light on what appeared to

10

Some scholarly work has been done on the United States’ role in the Horn of Africa,
but it has been relegated to mostly political scientists and policy experts. See Jeffrey A. Lefebvre.
Arms for the Horn: U.S. Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia, 1953–1991 (University of
Pittsburgh ,1992).
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be a selective application of human rights by Carter, something that has been a common
critique of his foreign policy.
The U.S. was fully aware of the implications of having a new crop of nations,
many of them rich with people and natural resources, emerge onto the international stage
during the Cold War’s height. Carter’s outreach towards LDCs to stave off world hunger
and garner their support was not a new line of thought, though the scale of his efforts was
entirely original. Earlier attempts were made by successive administrations during the arc
of decolonization to woo these newly emergent nations to the side of the United States.
President Kennedy, for instance, created the Peace Corps as a method of influencing
LDCs by assisting their modernization efforts, and also organized the Alliance for
Progress in South America, which was formed to buttress food production levels in South
American nations.11 Carter’s attempts to increase food surpluses and funnel resources
dedicated towards alleviating existing and future world hunger and improve the standing
of the United States internationally mirrored earlier efforts. International famine had been
a problem that presidential administrations were aware of stretching back to Eisenhower.
In 1954 President Eisenhower created the Agricultural Trade Development and
Assistance Act which established that surplus "agricultural commodities" would be stored
and then sold to allied states to alleviate famines if needed.12 President Kennedy created
the Alliance for Progress in 1961 and a little over a decade later in 1974 President Ford
tasked the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) with studying the effects of long term

11
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hunger on the international system.13 The resulting NAS study was published in 1977
suggested increased amounts of resources be dedicated towards food production and
nutrition research, but warned that rampant poverty would be a major contributing factor
to hunger, as opposed to purely scientific or agricultural issues like chronic drought or
infertile seasons. The best way to combat hunger and malnutrition worldwide would be to
establish firm grain reserves to account for fallow years, expand the agricultural and
economic capability of LDCs who lacked sufficient means to produce for themselves,
and to provide more efficient scientific methods of producing food.14
By 1977, estimates of Carter’s staff found that over a billion people were
malnourished around the world, the greatest number of which were found in Africa, in
the Sahel and Ethiopia especially. Ethiopia in particular became a point of contention
because of its poor human rights record and because of the development of close ties to
the Soviet Union. The Carter administration’s attitude towards Ethiopia was influenced
greatly by the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia, and exemplifies how both
superpowers played African nations off of one another to leverage more power by proxy
in the Cold War. In July of 1977, Ethiopia was invaded by Somalia in an attempt by the
Somali government to gain control of a portion of Ethiopia, called the Ogaden, which had

13
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a large number of ethnically Somali people living within its’ boundaries.15 At the time of
the invasion Ethiopia had been courting Soviet aid for several years. The socialist Derg
ruling body led by Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, which had been established in 1974
when a coup ousted Emperor Haile Selassie, had been trying since it came to power to
solidify negotiations with Moscow for military and economic assistance. Repeated
failures to establish firm trade ties were attributed by the Ethiopian government to the
Soviet’s pre-existing agreements to provide similar aid to neighboring Somalia.16 The
USSR and Ethiopia moved slowly, over the course of three years, towards a closer
relationship. Somali-Soviet ties, once strong, also began to unravel during this time
period, as Somali leader Siad Barre lost the trust of both Moscow and, significantly,
Cuba, as both countries began to doubt Barre’s commitment to the socialist cause and
Somalia’s ties to the U.S.17 Cuban dictator Fidel Castro had already begun to throw
around his authority in Africa, most recently by assisting in the 1975 Angolan revolution
by sending tens of thousands of troops to ensure the socialist rebels’ victory. Mengistu
entreated both Havana and Moscow for aid following the Somali invasion, hoping that
fellow socialist nations would come to Ethiopia’s rescue, desiring a repeat of Castro’s
willingness to support Angola’s socialist revolutionaries.18
The initial invasion was disastrous for the Ethiopian government, as they rapidly
lost ground to the Somalis, and both the USSR and Cuba refused to send the levels of
military assistance needed to hold off Barre’s forces. The Somali forces eventually thrust

15
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far enough into Ethiopia to threaten the capital of Addis Ababa, forcing Cuba and the
Soviets to send a large amount of military aid, consisting of over ten thousand Cuban
troops, six thousand advisers, and $1 billion of military supplies that allowed the
Ethiopians to push the Somalis back.19 In his assault, Siad Barre had revoked his promise
to the Soviets that he would not advance into Ethiopia to take the Ogaden, causing the
USSR to dissolve the existing arms agreement with the Somali government and formally
declared itself on the side of the Ethiopians.
Mengistu had already begun to cement his alliance with the USSR in April of
1977 when he shuttered several major U.S. government and military buildings within
Ethiopia’s borders, demanding that their personnel return to the United States. When the
Soviets declared the Somali arms agreement void, Barre cut ties with both Moscow and
Havana, expelling their personnel and shuttering their military stations within Somalia’s
borders, mirroring Mengistu’s own actions months earlier towards the U.S. The USSR’s
actions in Ethiopia and Somalia illustrated their own desires to gain influence in Africa,
improving relations with newly independent African nations by fostering the ability of
these states to remain sovereign and secure, even from one another, and providing much
desired military and economic aid. Arab nations allied with the United States were
publically supporting Somalia's invasion, while the majority of African nations supported
Ethiopia.20 In the instance of Ethiopia-Somalia conflict, the United States found itself on
the side of the unpopular aggressor by not strenuously arguing against Barre in the public

19
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sphere and providing him small amounts of assistance.21 Carter attempted to turn public
relations around after the debacle by emphasizing the fact the USSR was a major arms
dealer to both sides of the conflict and arguing in a press conference that Moscow ought
to cease influxes of weapons that perpetuated the conflict.22 Carter had no desire to see
the Soviets gain more popularity in Africa than they already had, and struggled to find a
way to temper their increased influence in the continent.
Throughout Carter's presidency, economic aid sent to Ethiopia was revisited again
and again as the flagrant violations of human rights within the country, such as mass
executions by the Ethiopian government under Mengistu, became more public.23
Mengistu’s overtly anti-American actions were considered by Carter's administration to
be both a backlash to criticisms leveled by the U.S. against Mengistu's atrocious human
rights record and a desire to knit closer relations with the USSR.24 Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) findings earlier that year found that the Ethiopian government felt that it
was being targeted by the United States in international forums for its alleged human
rights violations.25 Multiple loans by the U.S. to Ethiopia were reviewed and eventually
abstained from in international forums like the International Financial Institutions (IFI,
which include organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank).
Additionally, military and security aid given to Ethiopia was cut, the nation's human
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rights violations and the uncertainty of its relations to the Soviets the cited reason.26
Because of obvious antagonism by the United States towards his government and the
impending slashes in aid, Mengistu had been and continued to pursue arms deals with his
communist allies.27
Significantly, despite the cuts to military aid to Ethiopia, the United States
continued to funnel food aid to the nation both explicitly and through various groups. The
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), for instance,
preemptively supplied the beleaguered Ethiopia in 1978 with over 10,000 tons of cereal
when international donors were unable to meet the demands of its hungry population in
time because the donor's food imports were reportedly rotting in the nation's ship clogged
major harbor.28 Over the course of 1979-81, the United States supplied over 1.4 million
metric tons of food for nations in East Africa, two thirds of which went to Ethiopia and
Somalia alone as they were the most in need. Ethiopia was, and continues to be, a poor
region for agriculture. Only small portions of Ethiopia are arable, and even fewer were
irrigated at the time.29
The fact that the United States scaled back its military and economic aid to
Ethiopia is not especially surprising. An anti-U.S. nation that favored socialism and
close-knit ties with the USSR losing military aid during the Cold War makes sense. More
broadly, however, the U.S. had to maintain its established position on assistance given to
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Ethiopia or else appear to be waffling and correcting their earlier support of the
territorially aggressive Somalis.30 What is important is both the continuation of food aid
to the poor African country and what other forms of economic assistance were cut. Aside
from military and police aid, money that was to be sent over for irrigation and road
construction was also removed after eventual deliberation. The dialogue within Carter's
administration over debates between keeping "agricultural irrigation" funding and nixing
"rural roads" is revealing.31 A National Security Council (NSC) staff member in 1977
remarked that "the distinction" between the two funding choices "escapes me."32
Irrigation in Ethiopia was remarkably poor, and necessary for what subsistence
agriculture that could be eked out of the land; simultaneously, the nation's road system
was in desperate need of modernization, particularly in rural areas. Ostensibly, within the
framework of Carter's human rights focused foreign policy both of these issues would
acceptably fall under improving the human condition of the people of Ethiopia, however
they ran aground of one of the main critiques of Carter's foreign policy: vagueness. There
was an absence of a clear definition of human rights and how it should be applied to
specific countries, and there were few clear-cut distinctions inherent in Carter's stated
policies. In the case of the annoyed NSC staffer, she was wondering how "human needs"
projects like irrigation and road building met a set of minimum criteria in order to
determine if funding would be given. Such criteria did not truly exist.33 Laws on the
books that governed how aid would be distributed to foreign nations were flexible, and
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ultimately the final decision on whether aid would be given was at the discretion of the
President.34 So long as the he felt that the aid would "be channeled to the needy" the
President could ignore the labeling of nations as "gross and consistent violators of human
rights" which technically disqualified them for aid packages.35
Although actual food aid continued to be given to Ethiopia, the kinds of
substantive, long term investments in the nation, things like irrigation and road
construction, were completely cut after the war with Somalia began and would remain so
until Mengistu was forced out of office in 1992.36 Years after the staffer's memo, in 1980,
the United States would be supplying a million plus metric tons of annual food aid to the
famine wracked East African nation, even as the U.S. refused to send any other form of
economic or developmental assistance.37 The complaints of the staffer, who later
wondered almost despairingly about the undefined nature of tracking human rights
violators, were never resolved; "I know we should maintain flexibility...but our internal
discussions should not be fuzzy."38 What was not "fuzzy" was hunger relief. Food was
easily understandable in the public mind and it was a simple thing to claim to the world
and the American people that the government of the United States had given literal tons
of food assistance to underdeveloped and hungry nations around the world, as few would
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gainsay the moral validity of doing so. Providing the kind of large-scale economic
assistance and systematic development aid that would help nations like Ethiopia in the
long term to develop its own independent food sources was more complicated. The fact
that Ethiopia was a clearly Soviet aligned nation, The lack of clearly established
definitions of human rights within Carter’s foreign policy meant that each case was met
without a truly comprehensive or cemented form of approach, as “flexibility” was the
watchword for policy makers within the Carter administration. The Carter
administration's haphazard style of choosing who would receive aid or not lent itself to
selectively applying its foreign policy. As a consequence, aid that perhaps ought to have
been given to some countries slipped through the cracks.
Despite the flaws, apparent even at the time, the continuance of food aid
regardless of other cutbacks in assistance reflected the intense desire to both appear to be
doing something substantive to help LDCs, especially in Africa, and to fulfill the human
rights orientation of Carter’s administration. Internally, the White House was eager to
engage domestically and internationally about food aid and human rights. The citizens of
the United States, according to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, had "a right to
know...how their taxes are being used to better the lived of people abroad", because the
average citizen did not care about abstract concepts like "resource flows amongst
nations."39 The "sterile texts" of laws and international trade agreements were not
effective methods of communicating to the public what was being done, nor were they
effective in garnering public sentiment.40 Only by addressing "concrete development
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problems", such as hunger, would the public understand and lend its full support.41 Only
when the "human focus" was brought into the spotlight could U.S. foreign policy be
understood.42
In this same vein of thought, Carter signed into law the International
Development and Food Assistance Act of 1978, which did not revolutionize existing
policy, it merely allowed for further levels of assistance to be given abroad, but did
include a section that explicitly detailed the "concept of using foreign assistance to fulfill
'basic human needs."43 Such language was meant to be relatable to the public. The
popularity of human rights policy was incredibly important to Carter's administration
because of the post-Vietnam malaise that pervaded U.S. public opinion during Carter's
term.44 “Vietnam Syndrome” gripped the mind of the nation, creating a public was war
weary, and not in favor of direct intervention abroad.45 Human rights policy more
broadly, but especially morally righteous portions like hunger, was viewed as a way to
garner domestic and international good will by taking indirect action around the world.
Food given to hungry nations demonstrably saved thousands of lives in a way that proxy
wars and morally ambiguous interventions against the USSR failed to show to the public
eye.
In another example, a few short months before he created the Food Assistance Act
of 1978, President Carter had created the Commission on World Hunger at the behest of
Congress. The Commission's original inception was focused on involving the citizenry of
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the United States in discussing and becoming educated about the "nutritional well-being
of citizens of the United States and of the world."46 Additionally, in order to appeal to the
broadest spectrum of people, Carter’s administration debated increasing federal funding
towards public education about world hunger because they felt that widely “based public
support” within the U.S. was necessary to maintain the social and political will to
legitimize Carter’s policy. Congress members hoped that efforts like education and the
Commission would encourage a dialogue amongst a "wide and diverse constituency" that
would support sustained action to curb world hunger.47 There was a basis for Carter and
Congress’ assumptions.
Domestic food aid had, during Carter's presidency, reached the highest levels
since its inceptions decades before, with nearly one in ten citizens of the United States
receiving food stamps by the end of his term in office.48 A decade before food stamps had
hit their socio-political zenith, as documentaries and television shows displayed how
prevalent hunger was within borders of the U.S. and forced politicians to propose
expanded food stamp programs.49 It is reasonable to think that the Carter administration
and Congress associated that the public's recent upwelling of support for food welfare
within the United States with interest towards food welfare abroad. Certainly food stamps
mirrored actual food aid, where it was a kind of pure service that was not easily abused.
Food stamps have historically a positive connotation within the U.S. because they are
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ostensibly only usable for redeeming groceries, much in the same manner that bulk
donations of cereal and grain given to famine stricken LDCs were made to be used just
for sustenance, and neither are as easily abused as, say, an influx of pure money.50 The
choice of continuing food aid to nations like Ethiopia begins to become clearer after
considering the many benefits that the Carter administration associated with hunger
relief.
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CHAPTER THREE: JIMMY CARTER AND IDI AMIN
Beyond Ethiopia, Carter had to contend with other problematic nations in East
Africa. Uganda, then under the rule of bloody dictator Idi Amin, had become a target of
Carter at the onset of his presidency, when he publically stated shortly after taking office
that Amin’s actions “have disgusted the entire civilized world” and that the United States
had no direct relations with the country.51 A blatant violator of international human
rights standards, Amin had slaughtered over 500,000 of his own citizens and forcibly
expelled nearly 100,000 Asian citizens since his rise to power in 1971.52 The brutal leader
responded much the same way that Mengistu Haile Mariam did when threatened by
Carter, publically scoffing at the United States’ apparent hypocrisy in criticizing what he
regarded as internal political matters when “Americans killed red Indians and invaded
Cuba...Are they not ashamed of the people they have killed in Vietnam? Are they not
ashamed of killing thousands in Hiroshima? Then they talk of Amin.”53 Carter’s
administration was enthusiastically joined by many other African governments in
condemning Amin’s rule, and began to enact, through multilateral apparatuses like the
United Nation’s Human Rights Commission (HRC), investigations and international
action. Although Uganda was an obvious and easy target for Carter in regards to human
rights, there were complications.
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At the onset of its independence in 1961 from colonial rule, Uganda was able to
produce enough food to feed its population.54 Over the course of Amin’s chaotic rule,
however, and the expulsion of tens of thousands of Asian citizens who comprised a
significant portion of the working middle class, food production levels dropped
precipitously. By 1972, a year after Amin took office, food production levels had dropped
by half, and this trend continued until 1980.55 Food scarcity in Uganda became a problem
during Carter’s presidency, which created an obvious conflict with his overarching
human rights policy. Providing food aid to Uganda could make the United States seem as
hypocritical as Amin accused. Because perception abroad was one of the major goals of
improvement for Carter’s administration, anything that could damage the international
image of the U.S. was dangerous. As such, in the same IFI votes on loans in which the
United States abstained from outright negation of aid for Ethiopia, the U.S. explicitly
voted “no” towards giving any form of aid to Amin’s regime, an affirmation both of
Carter’s anti-Amin and pro-human rights stance.56 Further confirmation of the United
States’ opposition to Amin came in the form of a trade embargo with the African country
in 1978.

Congress, a few weeks after Amin was out of office, and at the strong
encouragement of Carter himself, repealed the bills that prohibited humanitarian and
economic aid being sent to Uganda, as well as the economic embargo on coffee in its
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entirety, although they kept the ban on military assistance intact.57 The degradation of
Uganda’s agricultural and economic integrity under Amin was exacerbated by chronic
drought in the region, and food aid levels under the guise of the World Food Program and
the Co-Operative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) rose dramatically postAmin.58 From an annual rate of practically nothing during Amin’s tenure in office, U.S.
aid rose to over a million tons of aid to the famine suffering nation.59 The reversal of aid
after Amin’s removal from power and the continuance of aid to Ethiopia are both
examples of the Carter administration’s foreign policy, entangled as it was dealing with
both image perception and actual humanitarian aid. International and domestic groups
had to be factored into every decision that Carter made, more so than other presidents
because of his explicit promise to reform foreign policy and provide a greater degree of
moral transparency to his administration. No longer would the popular image of the
United States be that of a hypocritical “arms merchant” that was more concerned with
“might and money” instead of actually pursuing the substantiating the ethics and morality
to which it publically held the rest of the world to.60 Carter quickly latched onto the fall
of Amin to promote the United States’ sudden willingness to end the sanctions placed
against the country. This seem surprising as the embargo was designed to weaken one of
Carters’ most frustrating enemies in Africa, but the administration was actually not trying
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to damage Amin with the embargo. Indeed, Carter was actively against the embargo
being passed by Congress in the first place.
The administration actively fought against the embargo that was placed on
Uganda in 1978 from its inception to the time it passed Congress. There were several
reasons that the administration gave to avoid the embargo. The administration took the
position that it was not the role of the United States to “attempt to bring about the
overthrow of foreign governments” as a major part of its foreign policy. The embargo
was intended to target Uganda’s main export, coffee, and destabilize the Amin regime.
The administration had been considering the repercussions of the downfall of the
Ugandan dictator for some time before Congress began to take independent action. The
CIA, in June of 1977, several months after Carter took office, created a report that
detailed the possible consequences that would arise should Amin be overthrown by a
coup or assassinated by an outside force.
The report describes the immense uncertainty that surrounded such an event
happening, as there were no leaders in the country that were able to unite the divisive
ethnic and cultural barriers of the different tribes that comprised Uganda. Should Amin
have fallen without a unifying leader to step into the vacuum of his death the country and
the region would have faced even greater instability. Most problematic is the fact that the
military would have been left leaderless, and without its main supporter, as Amin used
the military to retain his stranglehold on the Ugandan government and people. Other
countries in the immediate area, especially Tanzania and Kenya, had been “long
concerned about Amin and his threat to their security,” and were likely to try to take
control of the downfall of Amin to try and create a more favorable outcome. The
22

administration was extremely reluctant to continue the kind of direct interventions that so
typified previous administrations, and were the kind of actions that Carter had explicitly
campaigned against.
International and domestic groups had to be factored into every decision that
Carter made, more so than other presidents because of his explicit promise to reform
foreign policy and provide a greater degree of moral transparency to his administration
than those prior. No longer would the popular image of the United States be that of a
hypocritical “arms merchant” that was more concerned with “might and money” instead
of actually pursuing the substantiating the ethics and morality to which it publically held
the rest of the world to.61 A firm military action by Washington would likely only make
matters worse in these regards. The United States would not appeal to the world by
inveighing in other nations’ problems, at least not as it had in the past. A more indirect
route was called for, yet the Carter administration refused to take the greater leap and
impose wide ranging and unilateral economic sanctions against Amin.
One of the other reasons the administration gave for not supporting sanctions
were the lives of the 200 or so Americans in the country, who were still at risk of
reprisals that the administration feared Amin would take should the embargo be passed.
Amin had threatened these men and women before, and the increasingly blatant human
rights violations of his own citizens made Carter even more reluctant to want to
antagonize the dictator beyond his usual calls in the international media for Amin to halt
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his actions. The United States had, the administration emphasized, already placed Uganda
under international economic reprisals, and distanced itself as much as possible
diplomatically from Amin’s regime. More action was not necessary, and even
undesirable. Perhaps most importantly an economic embargo could also backfire, as it
would set the precedent that could be dangerous. Other nations could do the same to the
United States or U.S. allies as well. The administration did not want to open the door to
large scale economic warfare in the context of the Cold War, or use it to affect changes
within other countries. Tellingly, the National Security Council advised President Carter
a year before Congress’ unilateral push through of the embargo that a soft approach
towards an embargo on coffee could be applicable, if it was kept low scale.62In a section
of a memorandum about possible human rights initiatives, the NSC called for the
President or Andrew Young to speak out against “gross violators” of human rights, and in
the case of Uganda, advised that Carter himself could “suggest, in a low key manner, that
Americans might want to organize an informal, voluntary boycott of Ugandan coffee.”
63

An informal boycott could do little to truly damage the Ugandan economy, but it would

garner a great deal of attention internationally and damage Amin in the sphere of
perception. The most problematic aspect of the sanctions, perhaps, was the assertion by
the Carter administration that Uganda would have little trouble finding new trading
partners for its much desired coffee crop. If the U.S. alone was the only country, or one
of the only few countries, to embargo trade with Uganda, it would largely be ineffective.
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Internal debate within Carter’s administration continued, however, over whether
or not the embargo should have been enacted and whether or not aid ought to be given to
Ugandans as it had to other human rights violators like Ethiopia.64 Ethiopia and Uganda
were both recipients of Soviet military aid and leaned towards the USSR in the Cold War,
which explains the refusal to provide either of them military and developmental
assistance, the U.S. would not want to strengthen the power of nations aligned with its’
rival in global power. Indeed, scarcely a few weeks had passed since the Amin had
threatened United States citizens at Entebbe airport and the Ugandan government was
hosting Soviet and Cuban ambassadors, State department documents show, where Amin
was “very happy” with the content of the meetings.65 Frustratingly for Carter, the human
rights initiatives that so typified his campaign and reorientation of U.S. foreign policy
slipped by him when it came to Uganda. Internally, the administration was increasingly
aware of the fact that other parts of the government, most notably Congress, were
advancing human rights causes unilaterally without the consent of the administration.
Indeed, the National Security Council created analysis papers for the President and
Brzezinski that highlighted the fact that Congress saw itself as the “promoter and
defender of human rights concerns” rather than the administration.66 In the notable case
of the Ugandan trade embargo, the NSC paper asserted, there had been established “the
general pattern that in most cases Congress has led and the Administration has
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followed.”67 Unilateral action in Congress had only increased, especially in regards to
blatant violators like Uganda, which had become a particularly popular point of
contention between the Congress and the administration.

Specific Congressional members successfully lobbied for increased attention to be
paid to Amin’s violations, most notably Senators Church and, especially, Donald J.
Pease, who had led the embargo and the anti-Amin movement. A small but very vocal
anti-Amin movement had been growing in American political circles since 1976, headed
by the former U.S. ambassador to Uganda, Thomas Melady.68 Melady and Ugandan
exiles spent great amounts of time lobbying Washington as well as going to churches
around the U.S. and giving testimonies about Amin's human rights violations, in
particular his efforts to kill Christians within Uganda.69 American sentiment against
Amin grew steadily, and these politicians, in particular Pease who had first started
investigating Amin and his connections to American coffee makers, seized upon the
opportunity.70 In terms of political clout, the embargo paid off for them as they were able
to lay claim to having been instrumental in the overthrow of the dictator.71The embargo
itself had little effect, as Carter had warned, on the Ugandan economy; however, analysts
at the time attributed the embargo’s real power not in economic terms, but in
psychological ones.72 The embargo threatened Amin’s power domestically, as it damaged
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his prestige and carefully cultivated personality cult, but it also emboldened Amin’s
regional enemies like Nyerere. The Tanzanian ambassador to the United States, Paul
Bomani, was reported to have said that the embargo’s passage was “a definite factor in
our counterattack in that it helped make the world community aware of Uganda’s human
rights violations…we sensed that public opinion would not be violently opposed to
Tanzania’s measures.”73
Mengistu’s campaign against political opposition groups was horrific, but the
total number of people killed was comparatively low when Amin’s body count is
considered. The Ugandan dictator’s bloody rule resulted in several dozen times the
number of Mengistu’s total casualties. Amin’s brutality was also much more advertised
in the international media because of its severity and the eccentric nature of the dictator
himself, which attracted increased media attention.74 The “flexibility” of human rights
policy under Carter becomes more readily apparent when the two cases are compared.
Carter was willing to selectively consider when he would give certain kinds of aid to
governments that violated human rights. Ethiopia, and many other nations that had
histories of human rights abuses like Indonesia, Zaire, and even Somalia were granted aid
as long as they agreed to explicitly use the relief that was given to them for those most in
need.75 No such offer was given to Amin. The Soviets were far less invested in Amin
than in Mengistu and the aid given to the Ethiopian government was much greater than
that sent to Amin. The comparative lack of aid sent by the Soviets was known by the
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Carter administration, and does not account entirely for Carter’s refusal to any aid, even
food aid, to Uganda. Amin, like Mengistu, was considered by the Carter administration to
be a destabilizing factor in East Africa, but the greatest difference between the two
leaders was Amin’s human rights record.
Despite the influence of the United States’ embargo on Amin’s fall and the
eventual food relief sent to Uganda, the situation worsened. Recent Washington Post
articles with titles like “Where Children Fight for Kernels”, “Diary of Anguished Trip to
Land of the Damned,” and “60 Million in East Africa go Hungry” had not only kept
Uganda within the public eye, but had caused increased attention directed towards East
Africa as a whole by illustrating the plight of those in the region, something that internal
documents show the Carter administration was aware of.76 There was a need, then, to
address publically and formally the steps that the administration was going to take in
order to assist the Ugandan people and their new government as it recovered from
Amin’s economic mismanagement and the increasingly poor drought in the region which
combined to worsen famine levels drastically. Carter eagerly pursued public venues in
which to display his administration’s commitment to human rights and world hunger.
A meeting with the Pope in June of 1980, for instance, became an opportunity for
Carter to propagandize. Internal documents show that his advisors were committed to
having Carter play up the United States’ role in alleviating hunger in Africa during his
visit to Rome. Publicity was the key factor in the meeting; four U.N. food agencies were
headquartered in Rome, and memorandums to Carter asked that he either make televised
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remarks to the heads of these groups or to general press meetings at their buildings.77 In
the words of the U.S. embassy to the Vatican “it would be far more effective and
dramatic for the President, in addition to discussing this issue [food relief] with the Pope,
to give twenty minutes of his schedule to a meeting with these important U.N. agency
heads. This in itself would generate favorable publicity…”78 The issue of greatest
importance in terms of public image making was famine in Uganda.. At a minimum,
Carter was strongly encouraged to engage the pope in dialogue about the plight in
Uganda and to use that “news peg” as a sound bite for later meetings with the press to
display both the fact that he was discussing hunger in Uganda with world leaders and
with humanitarian leaders like the Pope.79 The inherently religious and moral nature of
the Pope’s office meant that he was an excellent publicity opportunity for Carter, and his
administration was fully cognizant of this fact. The way that the Carter administration
conceived of public opinion improving during the visit to the Vatican was in and of itself
rather revealing. The meeting with the Pope would appeal to not only “religious” and
“charitable” constituents because of the Pope’s rather unique position as an international
figurehead, but also “black groups” at home and abroad because of the topic of
conversation, famine in Uganda.80 The “black groups” at home in the U.S. were of
particular concern for Carter because of increasing popular opposition to his
administration’s lack of substantive effort to halt racial injustice in South Africa.
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The apartheid regime in South Africa had been the most glaring and consistent
violator of human rights within the African continent for decades, and continued to
pursue increasingly harsh measures to keep itself in power during Carter’s presidency.
Indeed, it was during Carter’s first year in office that Pretoria began a dramatic
crackdown on its black citizens, banning newspapers and jailing prominent activists.81
Carter and his administration, from the outset of his term of office, had been concerned
with fixing the image of the U.S. as a facilitator of the regime in Pretoria because “past
support of South Africa…is viewed by many as our single most repugnant policy in the
area of human rights.”82 Carter’s administration, over the course of his presidency,
continued to try and publically decry South Africa because doing so allowed Carter to
garner support from African governments who entirely opposed the apartheid regime.
Anti-apartheid rhetoric “greatly enhances our stature in the area as a whole,” as a
memorandum to the Secretary of State said, even as African nations grew frustrated that
change was not occurring.83 Unfortunately, although the rhetoric was present there was a
lack of truly effective or groundbreaking efforts by Carter or any previous administration
to tackle Pretoria head on. Over the course of nearly two decades, from 1961 to Carter’s
entrance to office in 1977, U.S. trade to South Africa had decreased in favor of
neighboring countries, but South Africa was still the region’s largest economy and an
important regional ally against Soviet incursion. The “middle–of-the-road-solutions”
were failing to achieve anything of note, largely because Carter’s stance towards South
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Africa was to be “correct but as easy on them as possible.”84 Black Americans were fully
aware of Carter’s waffling approach and were utterly dismissive of it. In the same article
that detailed Idi Amin’s speech in which he called out U.S. hypocrisy, the writer made
note of a black lawyer that angrily asked why “President Carter, and United Nations
Ambassador Andrew Young” did not apply the same scrutiny of human rights towards
“Ian Smith of Rhodesia or John Vorster, Prime Minister of South Africa. Carter is not
writing to Vorster saying the whole world is outraged.”85 Secretary of State Young had
even ruled out military intervention in the region on either side of the conflict, whether
that meant opening up the extant support of the apartheid regime in order to keep its
support, or to overthrow it. Military intervention was entirely unviable because it may
cause “a civil war at home” due to the fact that “the U.S. armed forces, which are 30%
black, wouldn’t fight for the South African government.”86 South Africa was a major
point of contention for both international and domestic perceptions of the U.S.
government. Carter’s solution, aside from wavering on a firm position on apartheid,
involved efforts like the meeting with the Pope.
In a speech on the 30th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR), President Carter remarked that “hunger, disease, and poverty are enemies of
human potential which are as relentless as any oppressive government.”87 The goal of
Carter’s reorientation of U.S. foreign policy post-Vietnam was to correct how the world
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viewed his country. The application of human rights provided a convenient, logical, and
appealing tool upon which Carter could affix his foreign policy standard. Rhetoric and
publicity were equally as important as actual efforts to correct human rights abuses and
failures abroad. Ethiopia and Uganda provide two examples, two sides of the coin of
Carter’s policy that illustrate the complex relationship between human rights, hunger, and
the gross realities of a global conflict. On the one hand, Ethiopia was a violator of the
human rights of its citizens, which meant that Carter had to oppose it on his human rights
principles, and additionally, Mengistu was a clear supporter of the USSR, which meant
that most forms of aid to the country would be a strategic mistake in the context of the
global Cold War; on the other hand, people in Ethiopia were starving. The “oppressive
government” that Carter mentions in the UDHR speech is present, and obligates Carter to
stop aiding Ethiopia. Hunger, however, provides a shortcut, a backdoor into the hearts
and minds of international and domestic populaces. Carter fed Ethiopia, he assisted in the
saving of likely thousands of civilian lives, and this was, in the eye of Carter’s
administration, a fact. A net gain was achieved even as the administration opposed nearly
all other aspects of Mengistu’s regime because positive publicity was garnered without
gaining it at the expense of Cold War strategic value.
Uganda is the opposite case. Idi Amin’s regime was too terrible, too fraught with
moral atrocities to support in any real regard while the dictator was in power. Amin’s
regime was untrustworthy, irrational in its bloody persecution of minority groups and
leadership to adequately rely on the dissemination of food aid to those in need. There
were no abstentions from voting on loans for Uganda, no ambivalence, only stark
negatives from Carter’s administration. The logical conclusion of the Carter
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administration was that Uganda was too far gone, a lost case in comparison to Ethiopia;
with Mengistu at least Carter could salvage a public image coup, albeit a minor one,
while still hurting an ally of the USSR, albeit in a minor fashion. Additionally, the stark
refusal to even supply food aid would lend even more weight to the full embargo and
multilateral restrictions placed upon Uganda by the U.S. and the U.N. The eagerness with
which the United States government created and pushed through bills removing the
barriers on aid and embargos towards Uganda could be construed as solely reflecting the
intense desire to enact positive humanitarian assistance and fulfill the moral imperatives
of Carter’s foreign policy. More realistically, however, the haste with which Carter began
to funnel aid towards the East African nation can be construed as also being done with
consideration towards publicity as well as helping the hungry. This is especially obvious
when taken into consideration with the scrutiny that the administration placed on Carter’s
subsequent public relations tour abroad, perhaps most tellingly the meeting with the Pope
at the Vatican. The emphasis on Uganda and famine relief efforts in Africa were appeals
to black Americans and other African governments who felt that not enough was being
done on apartheid. Hunger and human rights were, once again, a tool by which Carter
could try to turn public opinion to his favor.
Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher claimed, two months after Carter
was sworn into office, that the adoption of human rights as his foreign policy was not
“because of its popularity” within the United States.88 The emphasis on improving the
image of the United States, explicit statements from Carter administration officials,
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seems to contradict Christopher’s testimony. The selective use of human rights by Carter,
his ability to ignore or simply accept human rights violators as recipients of food aid, and
even economic aid in some circumstances other than Ethiopia and Uganda, undermines
the morality of his foreign policy. In Carter’s inaugural speech, he promised that he
would be guided by a “moral sense” that “dictates a clear-cut preference for those
societies which share with us an abiding respect for individual human rights.” The United
States would “not seek to intimidate” though “it is clear that a world which others can
dominate with impunity would be inhospitable to decency and a threat to the well-being
of all people.” Well-meaning words, but the moral stance of his policy is lessened by the
fact that food aid was not sent to Uganda. This paper assumes that Carter’s logic in this
regard was informed by Amin’s wretched human rights record, and the lack of trust in
Amin to justly distribute aid, but from a purely moral stance, a purely altruistic position,
food aid could have still be sent. Even if Amin doled out pittances lives may well have
been saved. That being said, Carter’s position makes sense in a foreign relations point of
view, a Cold War geopolitics standpoint, but the fact that Carter emphasizes morality
makes his position awkward to maintain at times. Carter’s administration danced the fine
line between needing to give aid and making sure that the recipients of that aid were
palatable enough to domestic and international audiences. Carter’s successor, Ronald
Reagan, would face similar problems in the Horn of Africa, as drought and famine once
again struck the region, and throughout his presidency would be forced to consider how
to address the issue of humanitarian relief given to the ailing people of the area.
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CHAPTER FOUR: A HUNGRY CHILD IS POLITICS
William P. Clark had a bad morning on June 27th, 1983. The day before, The
Washington Post published another damning indictment of the Reagan administration’s
failures to relieve famine in Ethiopia. Clark, the National Security Advisor to Ronald
Reagan, went to work, and received a memorandum explaining how to answer the bad
press that the Post articles would inevitably create.89 The exposé accused the
administration of politicizing the crisis, of “turning its back on the potential disaster” that
the drought inspired famine was causing because the Ethiopian government was allied
with the Soviet Union.90 The memorandum advised Clark to hold fast, defending the
administration’s meagre amounts of aid being sent to the beleaguered African nation and
the reasons behind their efforts. The American people, Clark was to say, often called on
the President to answer disasters without regard to Cold War politics, and this moral
obligation was unshaken under Reagan’s tenure; the resources being sent to Ethiopia
were to “feed starving people”, because this was “a policy of this administration” to act
on disasters “without regard to politics.”91 Clark’s suggested responses were, however,
fabrications. The Reagan administration was absolutely concerned with politics in the
Ethiopian famine, and the Cold War’s influence seeped into every aspect of their
considerations about how they ought to address increasing calls to action.
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Ethiopia’s drought and subsequent famine were not isolated incidents. Beginning
in 1983 and lasting until early 1986, the vast majority of the Horn of Africa was affected
by severe drought, this occurred again in 1987-88. Although warning signs were present,
and reported on by a variety of governmental and non-governmental agencies, the West,
and the United States in particular, failed to respond with the needed speed or strength of
effort to head off the famine, a fact known at the time. Throughout 1983 and into 1984
the Reagan administration came under continuously escalating scrutiny for its lack of a
substantial relief effort in the media, which peaked in the fall of 1984. Reports on the
increasingly dire situation in the Horn were prevalent, and found their way onto the front
pages of dozens of major publications, winding up on the front porch of thousands upon
thousands of Americans.92 Although reluctant, Reagan acquiesced and began to funnel
gigantic amounts of humanitarian relief towards Ethiopia.
However the problems that Reagan faced in the Horn were themselves part of a
larger web of security problems that embroiled several continents. The Reagan
administration was concerned not only with the regional issues that were facing the Horn,
but the global security problems of the Cold War. The wars in Afghanistan and Iran were
perceived to be major security threats for the United States by the Reagan administration,
and the Horn of Africa was considered to be a fairly important strategic location in the
security of the Middle East. The humanitarian crises that faced the Horn did not exist in a
vacuum, indeed quite the opposite was true; the ever shifting network of security
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problems that the Cold War presented the United States directly influenced their
decisions on whether or not to provide hunger relief, and the manner in which they went
about addressing drought and famine in the Horn of Africa.
Ronald Reagan entered office at a tumultuous time. Two large-scale wars in the
Middle East were raging, and the former actor was entering into the ring, as it were, right
as the Cold War sloughed off the final vestiges of the 1970s détente and the conflict fired
back up. The Horn of Africa has long been strategically linked by the United States to the
larger security of the continent and the Middle East because of its proximity to the area,
particularly the Gulf States, and the Reagan administration felt no differently.93 Ethiopia
had been receiving large amounts of economic and military assistance from the Soviet
Union since 1977, after they had a falling out with the United States, and began courting
the USSR for aid. Indeed, the Horn had been one of the many chessboard conflicts
between the Soviet Union and the United States for some time; by the 1980s, Ethiopia
had emerged as the Soviet Union’s last bastion of direct support in the Horn, after the
USSR had bungled relations with allied African governments in the previous years.94
Through the Ethiopian government the Soviet Union was able to strike out at U.S.
interests in the Horn. It is not surprising that the neighboring nation of Sudan was
regarded by the United States as one of its greatest allies in the area.
The United States considered Sudan an important regional partner, alongside
Egypt, in the strategic security of the Horn, and North Africa more generally.95 Economic
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and military assistance to Sudan had steadily increased since Reagan’s presidency began
in 1981, and would continue to do so at a small but steady rate for most of the decade.96
Reagan’s administration made early commitments to the security of the Horn through
Sudan, continuously thinking of the country when it was considering strategic questions
of the region. When Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat was assassinated on October 6th 1981,
for instance, two days later the Reagan administration resolved to not only increase the
levels of military assistance and training exercises for Egypt, but Sudan as well.97
In effect, the Horn was split in two. The Soviet Union had Ethiopia as their
catspaw, and the United States had Sudan. The situation became exponentially more
complicated in 1983 as the drought began to take hold, and a rebellion in South Sudan
against the established government formed, backed in large part by Ethiopia. In 1983, the
Sudanese President Gaafar Nimeiry instituted Sharia law in his nation, and the backlash
against this action, as well as his government’s favoritism for the northern regions of the
state led to the creation of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (here on SPLA). The
increased unrest was exacerbated by the ever increasing drought and famine, the two
events merged together to present a clear danger to the stability of Sudan and, in the
minds of American policy makers, the region as a whole.
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Historians that have examined these events have largely focused on this narrative,
exploring the manner in which the United States provided and used humanitarian relief in
Ethiopia. A relatively small number of scholars have looked at the history of the famine
since the mid to late 1980s and early 1990s, as such the vast majority of work done on the
subject was written only shortly after the events that occurred took place.98 Newer work
on the famine has been scarce, the most prominent example being Alexander Poster’s
examination of the logistical and strategic efforts of the Reagan administration in
providing aid to Ethiopia to discredit the Soviet allied regime under Mengistu Haile
Mariam.99 Poster’s scholarship is focused, however, like so many of the previous
examinations, on Ethiopia. The larger Horn region has been neglected in the
historiography of both the region and within the field of diplomatic history. Although
studies of famine (and be extension human rights) have become increasingly common
amongst historians of foreign relations, the Horn has been looked at in depth by only
Poster’s work.
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Nick Cullather, Michael Hogan, and Kristin Ahlberg are amongst the historians
that have expanded our understanding of hunger and the complexities of humanitarian
relief in their monographs. 100 Ahlberg’s Transplanting the Great Society in particular is
the most recent look at how hunger and humanitarian relief were used as tools of foreign
policy, specifically during Lyndon Johnson’s administration.101 Save for Poster, these
historians have not yet examined the Horn region in their studies of famine and relief
efforts in terms of foreign policy. There are gaps, then, in the historiography. Extant area
studies have not looked, for the most part, beyond Ethiopia, and foreign relations
historians have similarly failed in this task.102 Foreign relations scholars that have
examined the Reagan administration, a burgeoning area of research as more and more
sources become available, have paid attention to his policies towards human rights, but
have largely ignored the Horn in their own research.103
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This paper will attempt to fill these voids, examining the famine relief efforts by
the Reagan administration in the Sudan during the 1983-86 famine and the 1987-88
famine, caching these analyses within a larger context of global security concerns and the
ways in which humanitarian aid was used to fight the battles of the Cold War under the
auspices of the Reagan administration. The administration used food aid as a tool of
foreign policy, using it to buttress allied governments to keep them stable and promote
regional influence. This paper is intended to be a compliment to Alexander Poster’s
argument that the Reagan administration was forced into providing hunger relief for the
Ethiopian famine by international and domestic pressure, largely from the media. While
this paper agrees with Poster’s work in this regard, Poster focuses on the issues of
perception and security within humanitarian aid in Ethiopia, effectively leaving out half
the story. This study instead looks at similar issues from the neglected perspective of
Sudan. By doing this, the paper builds upon the half-finished narrative of the famines that
struck the region in the 1980s, providing not only a greater understanding of these
humanitarian crises, but also the ways in which the global Cold War influenced
ostensibly humanitarian relief efforts.
The Horn, and Northern African more generally, was an important region for
Cold War strategy concerns. “In light of the region’s position opposite NATO’s southern
flank”, a National Security memo states, the U.S. had to “devise appropriate policies to
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promote and protect American interests.”104 The Horn’s important geostrategic position
involved a complex mix of military positioning and regional influence. Although not
literally located in the Middle East, cultural similarities and geographic proximity meant
that the Horn was quite often attached to the region and considered an Arab state by
policy makers.105 It’s position off the directly off the coast of the Suez Canal and the
Arabian Peninsula, as well as its relative closeness to the Persian Gulf, made (and
continues to make) the Horn of Africa ideal for extending influence throughout North
Africa and the Middle East.106 The expansion and control of influence in these regions
was considered quite important to the Reagan administration. Similarly, the Soviets
themselves had long connected the Horn to the broader span of security interests in the
Middle East and the Indian Ocean. Ethiopia had been their greatest ally in the Horn since
the late 1970s, and they continued to expand their influence by increasing support to
other friendly governments like Libya. The USSR negotiated economic and military
assistance treaties between countries that it favored in the Horn, linking them together not
only in an economic sense but a strategic one. In 1981, Libya, Ethiopia, and communist
separatist state of South Yemen signed a “Treaty of Friendship and Co-Operation”,
jointly condemning United States influence in the region at large and the recently
increased US military presence.107 The Treaty marked the first time that African and
Middle Eastern governments, allied with the USSR, formed a cohesive alliance that was
aimed explicitly at denying the United States a role in the Horn.108 Nimeiry himself was
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rumored to have claimed that the three governments were actively conspiring against him
and his government during these Treaty meetings; ultimately his fears were proven to be
true.109 Given the larger conflicts that were being waged between the Soviet Union and
Afghanistan, as well as between Iran and Iraq, large portions of the Middle East were
under in the bloody shadow of war and uncertainty. The Reagan administration
understandably viewed these intra-state conflicts as dangerous to the integrity of the
Middle East as a whole, and devised plans to fall on the right side of the wars.
In both the Iran-Iraq war and the Soviet war in Afghanistan, the United States was
determined to spin both conflicts in their favor. In Afghanistan, for instance, the U.S.
wanted to keep the aggression of the Soviet Union at the fore of international discourse
about the conflict, maintaining the image of the USSR as the instigators of the war.110
Importantly, the U.S. wanted to keep this idea in the mind of “Third and Islamic world”
states, in order to promote Soviet isolation.111 Additionally, the U.S. wanted to “show
firmness of purpose in deterring Soviet aggression in the Third World”, in order to better
garner support of Third World nations against the Soviets. Just as in Afghanistan, the
United States was backing a country that was being invaded by the Soviet Union, in the
case of Sudan it was at least by proxy via the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army
(SPLA), the rebel movement in the southern region of Sudan.
Similarly, in the Iran-Iraq conflict, the United States wanted to head off regional
instability by mitigating the dangers posed by the war, because these conflicts “posed
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dangers to…vital interests” of the United States.112 The Iran-Iraq war posed dangers to
the Persian Gulf, especially towards shipping and the oil trade in Saudi Arabia; the
United States planned to respond to the continuously escalating conflict by reaching out
towards regional allies and increasing the levels of military and economic assistance
towards key partners.113 Indeed, the rhetoric of the Reagan administration became
increasingly dire about the security of the Gulf as the war between Iran and Iraq dragged
on; the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez Canal, and both the Arabian Peninsula and Persian
Gulf were placed in danger of instability. These regions were viewed as extremely
important for global economic security, and the White House was determined to keep
them open by “whatever means necessary.”114 The possibility that oil routes would
become blocked or somehow under the control of Soviet allies was a very tangible threat
in the minds of policy makers in Washington early on in the conflict. In 1983, the
administration called for NATO and its allies to be prepared to support with military and
economic assistance “poor but important” nations such as Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt, and
Sudan.115 Effectively, these allies were to be put on alert, and be ready to assist in the
possible efforts to “interdict Soviet combat forces to the Gulf region.”116 Beyond direct
intervention, which was the least preferable method of influencing the outcome of the
conflict, the U.S. wanted to expand the role of regional allies, such as Egypt, and as this
paper suggests, Sudan, in their ability to provide military assistance if possible to Iraq.117
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In order to understand the multilayered problems that faced Sudan, it is most
logical to begin with the longest standing one: famine. The Horn of Africa had faced
waves of drought inspired famines for centuries before the 1983 disaster began, although
this drought was the worst in the past several decades.118 The 1983 drought was part of a
larger cycle of twenty years of decreased rainfall levels that fell well below the average
for the region.119 One of the largest problems that Sudan faced, and continues to face, is
the dramatic variance in its weather. Rainfall averages vary wildly based on location, and
while northern regions could receive an adequate supply, communities not far to the
south might get little to none.120 Annual averages for rainfall are also deceptive; although
rainfall levels in 1985 were, for instance, actually above average, the rain was so
inconsistent in where and when it fell that farmers were unable to complete their
harvests.121 The Reagan administration was aware of the problems that the region faced,
and identified hunger as one of the greatest threats that these countries endured.122
Although the droughts were often severe, as the one in 1983 was, the sheer scale
of this famine in Ethiopia was, in part, due to the Mengistu regime’s mismanagement of
the crisis, where he did not want to acknowledge the famine in public; similarly, in
Sudan, the drought was complicated by Nimeiry’s refusal to address the problem in a
timely manner. Nimeiry did not want to draw attention to the fact that a famine was
occurring because he thought it would damage his reputation and the reputation of his
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government. 123 The reluctant nature of leaders in the Horn to admit that famine was
occurring is actually not that surprising. There is a long history of famine causing
disruption in the region, of course, but more than just brief periods of starvation and
socioeconomic unrest these events have heralded the end of established governments.
The leader of Ethiopia before Mengistu, the Emperor Haile Selassie, was ousted in a coup
because, in part, of his blunders in addressing famine that struck the country in 1974.124
Famine, then, ought to be viewed as a fixture in the lives of the people of the Horn of
Africa, especially in Ethiopia and Sudan.
Although the Nimeiry regime refused to admit publically that the drought and
famine were happening, there were other problems that were brewing in Sudan.
Nimeiry’s enshrinement and enforcement of Sharia law codes created a great deal of
blowback throughout the country, part of a larger series of mishaps by his government. In
1983, he split the southern sections of Sudan so that the northern regions had favorable
control of oil fields; this favoritism was part of a longer history of irredentism present in
the southern areas, which Nimeiry resented, and had only come to terms with the
rebellious elements in the South a decade prior.125
Part of the agreement was that the south was to gain increased autonomy, but
Nimeiry refused to follow through. The partitioning of the southern regions was, in
combination with the advent of Sharia laws (known as the “September Laws”) the final
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straw; elements of the army mutinied and, under the leadership of John Garang, formed
the SPLA.126 The SPLA received assistance from the very beginning from the Ethiopian
government because its stated goals were to overthrow Nimeiry’s government, to
recognize the right of self-determination for the regions of Sudan if unification was not
possible.127 The Soviet Union was funding the Mengistu regime, who in turn were
providing a base of operations and logistical support for the SPLA.128 The Cold War
connections begin to become more evident as one connects the role of Ethiopia in the
formation and promulgation of the SPLA movement, which was still headed by John
Garang, who was ardently opposed to Nimeiry’s regime.129
The U.S. was aware of the interlocking nature of these threats to Sudan, and the
broader Cold War security implications, which influenced their understanding of the
relief effort. Although the necessity of humanitarian relief was not in question, the exact
method of going about providing relief was debated. On the committees to examine the
famine relief that was to be sent to Ethiopia and Sudan the members of Congress
discussing the allocation of aid were well aware of the civil war that was occurring in
Sudan at the time.130 By 1985, the relief effort to quell the famine was well under way,
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and the committee was rife with stories told by impassioned congressional members who
had gone to the Horn themselves and saw the devastation that the disaster was causing
firsthand. Howard Wolpe, the head of the subcommittee on Africa, opened the hearing
with a personal anecdote, describing how he had seen “…6000 people who had traveled
over 30 kilometers waiting for food”, but despite the already “There was no transport
available to bring food to these people.” Six children died that morning.” Ethiopia was
identified as a humanitarian crisis, as was Sudan, but both had some congressmen
questioning the viability of aid because of the civil wars that were occurring between
rebels in Ethiopia trying to overthrow Mengistu, and the SPLA and Nimeiry’s
government forces fighting.131 The committee met to discuss the viability and need for
increased amounts of aid, and the heart-wrenchingly dramatic testimony of people like
Wolpe, alongside the still ever increasing levels of media attention that the famine was
garnering, meant that the aid was approved with a small degree of disagreement.
The aid sent to the stricken regions was distributed through a variety of different
nongovernmental organizations and aid groups. There were a multitude of problems with
this, however, ranging from inefficiency, corruption, and even a lack of vehicles needed
to transport the aid relief to stricken areas. Aid imports sat in port towns for weeks or
even months, rotting in their shipping containers.132 Relief supplies were being sent out to
these areas piecemeal at best, and although the U.S. government was aware of the
problems that beset the relief effort they remained insistent that their humanitarian
assistance was both successful and, on the whole, appropriately executed.133 Wolpe, in
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his opening statements before the committee, took pains to make clear the fact that the
United States efforts were not in question as such, that he wanted to “…emphasize this as
strongly as I can, that the issue is not whether the United States has made a generous
response to the African famine crisis. Clearly it has.”134
The problems to which Wolpe referred were not with the amounts of aid sent, but
with the logistics of relief efforts, the “transportation bottlenecks” that were killing
people because they hampered the timely flow of humanitarian relief from reaching them.
Because of the delayed nature of famine relief in the 1983-86 famine, the fault of which
lies both on Mengistu and the United States government, relief was unable to arrive to
stave off the worst effects of the famine.135 Additionally, Mengistu’s government refused
to allow the timely movement of these supplies. Similarly in Sudan, Nimeiry’s
recalcitrance delayed the beginning of relief efforts, and he failed to adequately assist in
the transportation of aid. Damning reports have emerged about the relief efforts,
especially in Sudan, which were primarily overseen by USAID in the 1983-6 famine; as
aid seen to have been “committed late, delivered late” and ultimately “failed to reach the
right people.”136 Indeed, some reports have discredited the severity of the famine itself,
saying that projections were overblown and the aid sent caused occasionally more
problems than it fixed.137 The supplies, somewhat ironically nicknamed “Reagan” in rural
Sudanese areas because of the perception that he was solely responsible for their arrival,
were something that people in the region were simply not expecting; “Who is this
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Reagan?” a farmer purportedly asked international workers, “…he ought to be
promoted!”138 The millions of Sudanese and refugee farmers that lived in the rural areas
of the country, and were thus always hit hardest by famine, were not used to outside aid
coming to them. Famine was a fact of life for most rural Sudanese, and they had their
own local mechanisms in place to deal with it.139
The logistical issues that the United States and international relief in the Horn are
complex, and the problems relating to Ethiopia have been more fully addressed elsewhere
by Alexander Poster.140 The logistical problems facing Sudan, however, were more
varied and inherently related to larger security problems in the region. The SPLA rebels
frequently attacked aid transportation convoys, stealing the supplies, and then falling
back. The guerilla tactics of the SPLA hampered an already inefficient process even
further. More broadly, the civil war was disrupting planting and harvesting patterns for
hundreds of thousands of farmers in the south. Cattle herders were unable to move their
herds to graze adequately, and what work was available rapidly dried up because of the
dangerous environment the conflict posed.141Similarly, Sudan was increasingly faced
with influxes of hundreds of thousands of refugees from neighboring nations due to
internal conflicts, primarily during the 1983-6 famine from Chad, but also thousands
from Ethiopia itself, who had fled the internal conflicts in Eritrea and Tigray.142 These
refugees presented an additional humanitarian crisis for the Sudanese government and the
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international relief efforts spearheaded by the United States, as they were, in a purely
logistical sense, hundreds of thousands of stomachs that needed to be fed on top of the
extant Sudanese population.143 By 1986, Sudan had the largest refugee population in
Africa; over a million refugees had sought sanctuary from drought, famine, and
internecine warfare within Sudan, and the Sudanese government was floundering to
provide them with the needed assistance to keep them alive.144 Sudan had been the home
for 750,000 refugees before the drought and famine began in 1983.145 Roughly 500,000
Ethiopians had fled to north Sudan and 250,000 Ugandan refugees had taken up residence
in the south.146 Once the drought began to truly take hold in 1984, over 300,000 people
fled from Ethiopia to Sudan, largely from the civil strife that was occurring in the
northern areas of Ethiopia. At its greatest point, the flow of refugees reached nearly 3,500
a day.147 Refugees from Chad also started to enter Sudan the same year, numbering over
120,000. The refugee influx lasted throughout the 1983-6 famine. Refugees from all
around the Horn fled to Sudan because of common concerns, largely revolving around
civil unrest in their home countries and the drought and famine that were plaguing the
area entire. These problems were further exacerbated by the overthrow of Nimeiry in
1985.148
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Nimeiry was ousted by a coup which led to a military junta led government until
1986, when free elections took place.149 The coup that removed Nimeiry from power was
a product of several factors, largely revolving around his bungled attempts to handle the
famine relief, refugee efforts, and his longstanding repression of the Sudanese people.
Nimeiry attempted to revolutionize Sudan’s agricultural sector, asking for ever increasing
amounts of money from institutions like the IMF in order to fund these efforts.150
However, these grand schemes failed, in part due to the harsh nature of Sudan’s climate,
but mainly because of the inefficiency and corruption that were present in the numerous
bureaucracies that Nimeiry created to run these agricultural schemes.151 By the height of
the drought and famine in 1985, Nimeiry had driven Sudan into 9 billion dollars of debt,
and interest payments became so high that they exceeded the revenue of Sudan from its
export income.152 Economic problems were not the only issues that were laid at
Nimeiry’s feet, however.
As far back as 1975 with the creation of laws like the State Security Act,
Nimeiry’s government began instituting laws that allowed for arbitrary arrest and press
crackdowns.153 The breakdown of the protections provided by the state to its citizens only
increased over time. By 1984, Nimeiry’s government effectively had fully sanctioned the
detention and sentencing without trial of political dissidents, and over 200 were held.154
The institutionalization of Islamic Sharia laws in 1983, and the strengthening of these
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laws the next year when Nimeiry attempted to declare an Islamic State, were also
incredibly detrimental to the political longevity of Nimeiry’s regime, despite the fact that
these actions were undertaken by Nimeiry as a way to appeal to the people. The forcible
application of such laws were unpopular amongst most Sudanese, despite the fact that a
large portion of the population was Muslim.155 Throughout Nimeiry’s efforts to remain in
power, the United States continued to provide assistance to the government. Despite their
best efforts, however, Nimeiry was overthrown.
The SPLA, however, was unable to reconcile itself with the interim government
and refused to take part in the elections that followed, and the war between the separatist
movement and the Sudanese government continued to smolder.156 The SPLA refused to
accept anything less than a secular, unified, and democratic Sudan, their stated goals from
the beginning of their insurgency.157 The interim junta and the newly elected government
that followed were politically weak, fledging as they were, and the United States viewed
their stability as important for the continued stability of the region as a whole.158 Food aid
continued to be sent to Sudan throughout 1986, despite the slackening off of the drought,
largely in order to make up for the initial failures of the aid that was sent during the 198485 period and to preempt the possibility of future problems, and the United States backed
the interim government formally. However, there were other security threats for Sudan
than the rebels and Ethiopia. “Sudan prides itself on being the largest country in Africa:
today its problems equal its size”, a Congressional report on the refugee crisis noted, due
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not only to the famine and rebel movement, but threats of direct military action by
outside governments. 159
The SPLA was being supported not only by Ethiopia, but Libya. Libyan leader
Muammar Gaddafi was Ethiopia’s closest ally in Africa for nearly a decade.160 Gaddafi
was happy to support the SPLA alongside Ethiopia in their efforts to overthrow the
Nimeiry regime, and continued to support them even after Nimeiry’s overthrow by
military forces. Qaddafi had a long history of sponsoring unrest in neighboring nations,
especially in coordination with the Soviet Union. In 1980, Qaddafi, at the behest of the
Soviets, had intervened in Chad to keep out what both the Libyan leader and Moscow
saw as Western attempts to influence the Chadian provisional government. 161John
Garang’s writings had successfully impressed Gaddafi personally, securing his assistance
in guerilla efforts for the SPLA in southern Sudan.162 Libya had engaged in repeated
terrorist attacks, the most recent at the time of the Congressional report mentioned above
in 1986. Libya had long been a thorn in the side of U.S. interests in Northern Africa, and
the Reagan administration had, from the outset, been determined to isolate and damage
Qaddafi’s regime as much as possible to mitigate its ability to destabilize the region, and
abroad.163 The antagonism between the United States and Libya had only served to
increase Qaddafi’s reliance on and ties to the USSR, who had increasingly provided
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military and economic assistance to the dictator since Reagan’s arrival in the White
House.164
Qaddafi was responsible for numerous terrorist attacks on Western targets, and
the U.S. placed increasingly heavy economic sanctions on Libya, baring Libyan boats
from entering U.S. ports and positioning military assets near the coast of the country as a
warning.165 Hoping to isolate Qaddafi, the Reagan administration optimistically yearned
for a popular uprising to occur and overthrow the Libyan leader. 166 As of the year that
the newly elected government was installed, Sudan was assailed on all sides, and from
within. Yet the U.S. government was optimistic, as the famine seemed to be dying down,
and the mistakes of the previous year and a half of relief efforts were being corrected. If
the lingering issues of famine and the refugee crisis could be successfully mitigated then
Sudan would be placed into an acceptably stable position.167 Unfortunately, the specter of
famine would return, as it always does, to haunt the Horn and foil the careful planning of
all sides.
In 1987 drought returned once again to the Horn of Africa. Lasting until 1988,
this drought was the catalyst for another wide-scale famine that struck the still recovering
region. “The tragic events which grip the Horn of Africa and threaten literally millions of
lives are, unfortunately, not new concerns for this committee,” said Mickey Leland in the
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opening statement of the committee addressing this new famine.168 Leland was one of the
major Congressional advocates for famine relief in Africa during the Reagan
administration and a member of previous committees on famines in the Horn that have
been referenced. Unlike the 1983-86 famine, however, the international community and
the United States was much more prepared to address the disaster. Having gained
experience during the 1983-86 crises, the relief efforts were more concerted, and tried to
avoid the pitfalls of the previous years that cut deeply into the efficacy of the aid sent.
Like the previous famine, the civil strife in both Ethiopia and Sudan was one of the major
issues that prevented the free flow of humanitarian relief. SPLA rebels in the southern
region of Sudan continued to ambush what aid convoys they could and the Sudanese
government purposely rerouted or halted aid sent to or near the southern areas because of
fears that the aid would be repurposed by the rebels and help keep the movement alive
longer, a reprieve bought with the lives of thousands in the south.169
In Ethiopia, a similar sequence of events played out, with Mengistu determined to
keep aid being delivered out of the hands of the rebel movements in Eritrea and the
Tigray, as a consequence of which, people died from starvation. Indeed, Mengistu
actually expelled all international aid workers from the regions of Eritrea and Tigray
because he feared that their efforts to provide food to the famine hit communities was
helping the rebels.170 The Reagan administration was vocal in its condemnation of the
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Ethiopian government’s efforts to selectively block aid packages, but comparatively
silent on Sudan’s similar efforts.171 This was an intentional effort on the part of the
administration, who still viewed Sudan as an important ally in the region, and had no
desire to begin to admonish it in the public eye.
The administration prepared statements meant to address media reports on these
discrepancies, most notably an article published in the Atlanta Journal Constitution that
lad out the hypocritical stance of the administration and the problems that Sudan faced
due to the rebel movement.172 The Reagan administration’s drafted response was meant
to mitigate the awkward stance the administration had taken in order to defend an ally’s
questionable practices. This position that the Reagan administration found itself in was a
byproduct of the larger Cold War considerations that colored the humanitarian relief
efforts throughout the entirety of both famines in the Horn.
Given the context of importance that the United States gave to the Horn, and
Sudan in particular, it is not surprising that they took an interest in helping ease the
famine that had hit the region. As Alexander Poster has suggested, a thesis that this paper
agrees with, the Reagan administration was muscled by domestic and international
pressures to provide aid to Ethiopia as well. Reagan had no real desire to do this, his
reluctance to give direct support to a communist nation was understandable.173 Indeed,
his fear that the vast amounts of aid that were being sent to Ethiopia would help keep the
country alive were well founded, as this is exactly what happened. Even then, Reagan’s
administration attempted to spin this in their favor, as Poster demonstrates, though they
171
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failed to actually complete this task. In the light of the Sudanese famine, the attitude of
disdain that the Reagan administration felt towards having to supply aid to the communist
nation becomes even more apparent. The purposeful disparity between the attention that
the Reagan administration lavished on highlighting the Ethiopian government’s failings
and similar instances in Sudan strikes a bold contrast. Famine’s longer history of
destabilization within the region meant that it posed a direct danger to the integrity of the
Sudanese government.
If Sudan fell, then one of the most important strategic partners in the Horn would
have disappeared. Viewed from within a more strategically oriented framework, the
outpouring of support for famine relief in Sudan takes on a much less altruistic caste than
people like Wolpe or Leland spoke of. The generosity of the United States was not given
solely for the moral reason of helping the hungry, but as a method of keeping an ally
alive, and more broadly, keeping American influence alive in a region of increasingly
vital importance. The dates of several of the National Security Decision Directives
correspond to the rising importance of the Horn in the minds of the United States
government; several immediately following the advent of the monolithic humanitarian
mission that was created to deal with the disasters in the Horn in 1983-86. As early as
1982, however, the Reagan administration was conceiving of the region as being of
importance beyond its borders, a key component of the security of the Persian Gulf and
Southwest Asia.174
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By moving beyond Ethiopia allows for a more nuanced understanding of how
famine and humanitarian relief were used for ulterior motives. The primary narrative of
Ethiopia in the literature, insomuch as the topic has been covered, has meant that the full
picture of the Cold War aspect of the famine has been ignored. Additionally, this more
complicated picture affects the ways in which the Reagan administration’s attitude
towards human rights can be understood. The reluctance to acknowledge that Sudan’s
policies towards the SPLA were hurting its own people, costing lives and, quite tangibly,
wasting the tax payers’ money, is as revealing as the strident declamations that Reagan
made about Ethiopia’s own human rights violations. The efforts by Mengistu to forcibly
relocate entire village communities in order to better cushion the blows that the famine
were dealing his populace was a resounding failure, resulting in the deaths of tens of
thousands of people. Mengistu smashed together multiple villages, attempting to
consolidate his control, curtailing the rebel’s ability to recruit and maneuver, and spread
the collectivization of his agricultural sector.175 In a mirror tragedy, thousands died in
southern Sudan as Nimeiry neglected and forcibly blocked aid to prevent rebel
cannibalization of his relief supplies. The hypocrisy in not condemning both sides is
evident, just as the initial attitude towards famine by the Reagan administration
demonstrates the Regan’s selective application of human rights morality.
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CHAPTER FIVE: “MAN’S MOST FUNDAMENTAL NEED”
The “hungry, angry…and bitter world” that Cyrus Vance spoke of failed to materialize
during or after Carter’s presidency, and there were no hordes of starving Third World
peoples laying siege to Western nations for bread. While Vance’s world did not emerge,
the “anguished world” spoken of in the Washington Post articles, the chronic but
manageable levels of famine and malnutrition, continue today. Many African nations rely
heavily on external sources of food aid to feed their populations; Ethiopia in particular
has failed to gain any real ground in tackling hunger within its borders as it alone
constitutes nearly a third of all 13 million famine stricken people in East Africa. The
addiction to order, to stability, that colored Carter and other Cold War presidents’
outlooks, resulted in tactics that had long-term unintended consequences for the
stabilizing nations. In the quest to maintain a positive image and promote order abroad,
the United States failed to fully comprehend the kind of aid being sent out, absorbed as it
was by Cold War considerations and maintaining a “flexible” style of human rights. Lost
in the cracks of that flexibility were nations like Ethiopia, who is now entirely reliant on
foreign food aid and in a very real sense, addicted.
Today, the Horn of Africa is still one of the largest recipients of aid in the world,
and currently receives the majority of aid sent to relieve famine on the continent.176 The
motto so often trumpeted by the Reagan administration of “a hungry child knows no
politics” is sorely undermined by the actual actions and motivations of the Reagan
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administration in tackling the famine in the Horn of Africa. Similar issues continue to
face not only the Horn in the present day, but other areas of the world stricken by
humanitarian disasters. The problems that the Reagan administration faced then are, in
many regards, the same ones that the world faces today, and the same attitude that the
Reagan administration had towards humanitarian relief is one that the world is trying to
slowly grow out of. Although the Cold War is no longer the umbrella threat of the
moment, security concerns still plague the area, as terrorism has replaced the Cold War as
the dominant security problem for the United States. The approaches that the Reagan
administration took towards addressing famine are the ones that the world, and the West
in particular, are
An Oxfam report in 1985 argued that “the crisis does not stop when Western food
aid arrives…if short term handouts are all we will give, we are merely postponing
famines inevitable return.”177 This projection towards the future played out. The aid sent
during the first famine in the 1980s did little to prevent the occurrence of a second barely
a year after the initial one ended. Aid sent by Western countries was, and continues to be,
sent out in the vague hope that by tossing enough assistance at problems that they will
simply go away by dent of the amount of aid sent. Unfortunately, the longer standing
issues that plague regions like the Horn are not so easily fixed. The “roots of famine”
were a complex web of short term decisions by policy makers of both Sudan and the
United States, and much longer standing and systemic issues like the cyclical nature of
drought in the Horn.178 The efforts of outside governments were, and still are, often not
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truly aware of the local context. It is easy for governments like the United States to send
over millions of dollars and thousands upon thousands of tons of humanitarian relief to
countries in need, but these are short term solutions to problems that have crested only
recently.
More complex solutions require a greater investment of time, effort, and monetary
value than governments, like the United States, are willing to provide easily. It was not
only simpler for the Carter and Reagan administrations to simply toss out huge amounts
of relief to the Horn of Africa, it was an appealing thing to do as well. The public
appreciated and more easily understood the idea that we, the United States, were sending
huge shipments of grain to people who were starving. It was far more complicated to
communicate to people that rural Sudanese and Ethiopian communities needed better
designed boreholes for irrigation, because the ones that were being used were fueling
over-grazing and feeding into a larger cycle of desertification that was exacerbating the
drought and, ultimately, feeding into the famine in the first place. Such complex issues
did not easily enter into the minds of the American people then and still, to this day, do
not. A multimedia extravaganza about hunger relief like the Live Aid Concert in 1985,
full of the popular heartthrob celebrities of America at the time, was something that was
infinitely more relatable to the average citizen of the United States. If Western
governments are to continue to spend large amounts of money on relief efforts, they need
to be better able to communicate the intricate nature of humanitarian aid, despite the fact
that over simplification is appealing not only to the public, but the governments that
derive their support from that public. A “hungry child” is relatable, and the removal of
something complex and crass, like “politics” from the media equation. It was, and still is,
62

a sign of the somewhat carefree attitude that the United States government takes towards
providing humanitarian relief. An attitude that seem to say, paradoxically, that the
“fundamental need” spoken of by Kissinger years before was less about helping others
and more about benefiting the United States.179
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